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Establishing the 
cultural identity 
of the west in the 
early Cold War: A 
conceptual approach
Despina Papadimitriou 
Panteion University, Athens
Exploring the semantic field of 
antitotalitarianism 
“Totalitarianism” was both an influential para-
digm in political sciences in the United States 
in the 1950s and a well-propagated concept. 
The term entered the political debate back in 
the 1920s but the early Cold War marked the 
high point of its presence in western public dis-
course. Though the Anglo-Saxon or Germanic 
paradigms had been more influential than those 
developed in France, Italy or Greece during the 
period, political lexicons, reflecting various ideo-
logical premises, were replete with words and 
expressions that treated the aforementioned 
concept. This article does not study the theory 
of totalitarianism – either in its scholarly or vul-
gar version – per se; that is to say, as a political 
theory and a philosophy of history,1 but as the 
frame that supported semantically the concepts 
implicated in an ideological struggle initiated by 
the emergence of east–west dualism; the new 
world division between two irreconcilable cul-
tural and ideological entities tied to two distinct 
economic and political systems. 
What it seeks to do is to explore the conceptual 
features of this new semantic field by attempt-
ing to interpret the conceptualisation of the en-
emy and the self within this field as an impor-
tant historical moment in the construction of the 
identity of the west. The text corpora constructed 
from a variety of Anglo- and Francophone and 
Greek primary sources (the German and Italian 
historical experience is drawn from secondary 
sources) make a conceptual-ideological analy-
sis possible. It not only puts emphasis on units 
of words but also on units of concepts, on the 
conceptual interrelationship, as well as on the 
interdiscursive materiality that is being con-
structed. Τhe primary material is drawn from 
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Encounter2 and Preuves,3 magazines associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF),4 
and other publications in France (such as the Gaullist magazine Liberté de l’Esprit and the Cahiers 
des Amis de la Liberté) and in Greece. The period examined is the early Cold War until the mid-
1960s when the western utopia5 started to be seriously contested.
The first point to bear in mind is that the new transnational discourse formulated during the period 
of transition to the postwar era is investigated not as a simple continuity but rather as a semantic 
innovation. This is due to the fact that the constellations of friend and foe, constituted against the 
historical horizon of the Second World War, were silenced in the 1950s and were replaced by new 
categories. These constellations, however, were not something totally new since the antitotalitar-
ian stance could be traced back to another temporal layer; the antibolshevism of the 1920s and the 
anti-Stalinism of the 1930s. For Tony Judt, the desire to forget the recent past – which prevailed 
on both sides of the divide – promoted a “future-oriented vocabulary of social harmony and ma-
terial improvement” and a movement of “trans-national unification tied to the reconstruction and 
modernisation of the West European economy”,6 while Benjamin Stora suggests that it is com-
mon for societies, after turbulent periods in their history, to develop on the basis of silences, in or-
der to safeguard their continuity.7 One could argue that what links political to conceptual history is 
the Cold War as a nonevent, in the sense that the experience of the Second World War did not en-
ter into the conceptualisation of the present during the 1950s. For Judt, the distrust of short-term 
memory, the oblivion of the recent past, made postwar rebuilding possible.8 
The second point that deserves greater appreciation for the linkages between political and concep-
tual history, as well as the culture–politics relationship,9 is the new element that characterised Cold 
War discourse in the west: the transfer of concepts from one country to another, from America to 
Europe and vice versa. This transfer was due mainly to the orchestration of the cultural Cold War 
by the CCF and to the common political allegiance of many European and American intellectuals to 
the antitotalitarian ideology. The transnational character of this discourse followed the linear border 
of the universal ideological division as opposed to the various, often complex, enduring realities of 
the domestic scene in different countries, the particular cultural zones, or the plurality of national 
histories. In most cases, during the period under discussion, the conflict between the two was re-
solved in favour of the common perspective regarding the values of the west. 
Cold War culture: between ideology and propaganda
The third point of particular interest to cultural history relates to the interplay, through political dis-
course, of identity politics and the construction of “otherness” with the values associated with the 
west. The cultural historian of the Cold War might be intrigued with the ways in which the core con-
cepts constitute the political language that formed the intellectual east–west divide, whether one 
interprets visual sources or texts. By pointing out what links a methodology with an historiographi-
cal field, I would like to suggest that conceptual history, despite the diversity of the genre, could be 
partly applied to Cold War cultural studies. 
According to Jean-François Sirinelli and Georges-Henri Soutou, editors of the volume Culture et 
Guerre froide, which was the product of a conference held at the Sorbonne and Sciences Po in Oc-
tober 2005, the cultural Cold War stands at the crossroads between cultural history and interna-
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tional relations, between the study of cultural transfers and the analysis of cultural diplomacy. Cold 
War culture is the cultural production created by the east–west divide and not just a domain of the 
relations between the then world superpowers. The French conference tried to study culture as a 
constitutive element of historical change.10 
What is attempted here is the positing of the concept as the object of historical investigation. Con-
cepts are investigated through various words which define and designate their meanings. It fol-
lows the German method in regarding the concept as a semantic field and not as a lexical item,11 
though Begriffsgeschichte has been mostly investigated within the limits of national languages and 
cultures. However, attempts have been made recently to expand the field of conceptual history, 
as in the case of Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink’s study of the conceptual field of the nation in France and 
Germany. In doing so, Lüsebrink develops both a comparative and an intercultural mode of inves-
tigation in conceptual history.12 Cultural historians are able to reconsider faux dilemmas and false 
dichotomies thanks to Reinhart Koselleck’s refined analysis of the temporal layers and the rela-
tionship between old and new. Moreover, the morphological analysis proffered by Michael Freeden 
contributes to the understanding of the conceptual interrelationship, complexity, and identification 
of the key concepts in a political discourse or an ideology.13 What therefore needs to be done is to 
describe the semantic and structural properties of the political discourse constructed in a crucial 
instance of western political thinking by American and European intelligentsia,14 during the 1950s 
and the early 60s.
Although the mobilisation of intellectuals during the Cold War was effected against communism 
and the nonalignment movement, and although evidence has been provided for the intimate rela-
tionship of the Congress for Cultural Freedom with the CIA, Cold War culture cannot be reduced to 
propaganda15 – a rather technical term appropriate to describe the practice of a specific medium, 
such as the Soviet and the Hollywood “message films” in the period after the Second World War, 
or to describe the persuasive devices and techniques exercised by several institutions and depart-
ments controlled by public authorities for propaganda purposes.16 In the case of the Nazi regime, 
which utilised the radio and the movie industry as influential propaganda devices, George L Mosse 
raised strong objections to the use of the term for an indepth examination of Nazism. Mosse denies 
the notion that Nazism was simply the product of mass propaganda and terror; instead, he sug-
gests that it had to be conceived as an immanent tendency with its roots in German sociopolitical 
development and völkisch culture. Claudia Koonz employs a cluster of concepts such as ethos, mo-
rality, and political culture, through which she explores the “process by which racial beliefs came 
to shape the outlook of the ordinary Germans”.17 
Nevertheless, propaganda is often inextricable from ideology,18 especially in the case of Cold 
War rhetoric, both in the west and in the east, and could be read culturally. Contemporaries did 
not use the term exclusively in a negative sense. The elites that promoted the virtues of freedom 
of expression and the proponents of antitotalitarianism who subscribed to the common values 
of the west felt obliged to secure an unlimited spread of their ideology – by all means, including 
propaganda – aiming mainly at domestic public opinion, especially in countries where the influ-
ence of communist parties on the intelligentsia and on society was great. Giles Scott-Smith, in 
an article on Melvin Lasky and Der Monat, highlights Lasky’s criticism of the lack of a consist-
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ent strategy that could counteract the wrong ideas which prevailed in Germany and in Europe 
about the United States. This anti-Americanism, evident “in different forms and in varying inten-
sity” in most European countries on both the right and left, often had a strong cultural charac-
ter, as was the case in Germany19 and in France. In December 1947, Lasky proposed to the Of-
fice of Military Government for Germany US (OMGUS) that the scope of Der Monat should be to 
“stimulate the German-reading intelligentsia of Germany and elsewhere, with the world-views 
of American writers and thinkers”. An additional task was also to demonstrate that “behind the 
official representatives of American democracy lies a great and progressive culture, with a rich-
ness of achievement in the arts, in literature, in philosophy, in all the aspects of culture which 
unites the free traditions of Europe and America”.20 Cultural diplomacy was given much promi-
nence in Germany, a defeated and divided country, whose western part was occupied by the 
United States and its allies. The official US operation to control its culture peaked in the early 
1950s. Despite occasional drawbacks, the “battle for the hearts and minds” of West Germans 
was for the most part won.21
The French monthly review Les Amis de la Liberté adopted, in its first issue in November 1950, 
the phrase with which Karl Jaspers greeted the first assembly of the CCF in Berlin: “Even the 
innocent needs a lawyer, even the truth needs propaganda.” In its next issue, the review pub-
lished an extract from a speech by the Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont, director of the CCF’s 
international secretariat, delivered in Brussels before its international committee and entitled 
“To make propaganda about freedom is to save our culture”. He said that although in the west 
people hated propaganda, they recognised that it existed and that they had to employ it some-
times. Propaganda was compared to the “microbes” which Pasteur used for the sake of peo-
ple’s health. He believed that fanaticism could not be opposed by fanaticism. Nevertheless, in 
the face of the threat that communism represented for Europe and its culture, he appealed to 
the awakening of spirits in the west, where people experienced liberty without appreciating it, 
much as was the case with the air they breathe. In this vein, he encouraged the use of the major 
media, radio, films and the press for the aforementioned purpose.22 Isaiah Berlin, on the other 
hand, believed that the answer to communism should not be a “counter-faith, equally fervent 
[and] militant”.23 Almost every paper presented at a CCF conference in Milan was “in one way 
or another a critique of doctrinairism, of fanaticism, of ideological possession”; in Edward Shils’ 
opinion, the general feeling characterising the conference was that of self-confidence as most 
of the conferees made no attempt to justify their beliefs and way of life in response to the com-
munist critique. Shils agreed with the aforementioned view when he argued that westerners 
had to reconstruct their beliefs “without yielding to the temptation to construct new ideologies, 
as rigid, as eager for consistency and for universal observance as those which have been now 
transcended”. Still, he suggested that the nations which considered their domestic policies with-
out regard for the distinction between left and right, socialism and laissez-faire capitalism, have 
most successfully managed their affairs (Britain, USA, West Germany, the Scandinavian coun-
tries and, to lesser extent, Italy and France).24 The development of Britain in the first half of the 
19th century illustrates, according to Michael Polanyi, the “effectiveness of dynamic political ac-
tion, carried on with little ideological guidance”.25 So, practical thought and disillusion, economic 
progress and freedom were highly valued.
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The antitotalitarian discourse and the tensions in the quest of identity
On the other side of the divide, the antiwestern Soviet propaganda of the early Cold War, also 
rooted in the early twentieth century and far beyond, initiated a semantic struggle to redefine 
ideology. In this respect, the campaign against the “adulation of the west” – which initiated the 
cultural Cold War on the Soviet side – was integrated to Zhdanovism and the official Soviet per-
ception of the other in the early Cold War (using elements of the xenophobic, hyperpatriotic 
propaganda initiated in 1942–43) with the alleged purpose of protecting Russian culture against 
western bourgeois influence.26 Whereas in the Soviet Union cosmopolitism and the generic de-
ideologisation associated with the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact (a process which was accentuated 
during the war) were thoroughly castigated and rebuked,27 in the west a new cultural politics 
was set in motion to promote western values against the ideological politics of communism. 
Even before that, however, shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War and as a reac-
tion to the signing of the Nazi–Soviet pact,28 the ex-communist Franz Borkenau launched the 
idea that there was an ideological bond between Germany and Russia, and that an ideological 
war was being waged – “a fight of the liberal powers of Europe against the biggest totalitarian 
power, Germany” – while at that time the German Reich was cooperating with Russia, “the oth-
er big totalitarian power of the world”.29 Still earlier, in 1936, Luigi Sturzo, the antifascist priest, 
wrote about the totalitarian states, and the French Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain used 
the notion of totalitarianism in order to designate “the double face of an atheist (Bolshevism) or 
pagan (Nazism) modernity”.30 
The origins of totalitarianism was a point of disagreement. Borkenau traced the origins of the to-
talitarian revolution, the world revolution against western civilisation,31 to the industrial system 
born in Britain and to the authoritarianism of the French Jacobins. The French historian François 
Furet, writing in the mid-1960s, saw the Terror as the essence of the revolution and as a harbinger 
of Bolshevism and fascism.32 Political conservatives such as Michael Polanyi and Robert Nisbet 
blamed not only the French revolution but also the culture of the Enlightenment, rationalism and 
Rousseau’s volonté générale, for the revolutions of the twentieth century.33 Replying to Polanyi in 
Encounter, Sidney Hook claimed that the founding fathers of the Enlightenment were not to blame. 
On the contrary, they were deeply suspicious of all forms of “messianic passion and zeal” and, as 
he stated, the Rousseauist “glorification of feeling” was alien to the thought of Locke, Hume, Vol-
taire, Bentham and the “philosophers-statesmen of the American Republic”.34 Representing the 
marginal wartime antitotalitarian thought along with Friedrich Hayek (The Road to Serfdom, 1944), 
Karl Popper, in his Open Society and its Enemies (1945), affirmed the impact of Plato, Hegel and 
Marx on twentieth-century totalitarianisms.
In the 1949 collective volume The God that Failed (in which six intellectuals describe their journey 
into communism and back),35 Arthur Koestler – the author of Darkness at Noon36 – referred to the 
revolutionary faith and devotion to pure utopia (which, in his opinion, was the case with the com-
munist creed), and to messianic fanaticism, which was immanent to totalitarianism (although the 
word did not figure in Koestler’s book and the theory of totalitarianism had not yet been elaborat-
ed).37 In another article published in Encounter, Koestler pursued a similar line of argument in dis-
cussing the prospects of a nuclear ban:
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 03:00:24 |
Establishing the cultural identity of the west in the early Cold War
76
To abolish the threat of atomic war is certainly desirable, but not in the realm of the possible. 
Interdiction of atomic weapons can only be effective if both parties agree to international super-
vision under conditions which include permanent inspection . . . But such a policy runs coun-
ter to the tradition of secrecy and distrust which Russia and the Asian nations have practised 
for centuries past; and it also runs counter to the basic principles and political structure of all 
dictatorial regimes, Communist or others . . . The Chinese Wall and the Iron Curtain are not ac-
cidents of history, but massive symbols of national traditions and social régimes whose exist-
ence depends on their ability to block the movement of people and ideas.38
By the 1950s totalitarianism became a prevailing concept not only in Europe, where it was born, 
but also – and particularly – in America. According to Abbott Gleason, it was also a “particular gen-
erational perspective, a gruesome collection of insights at which people arrived during a partic-
ular period, having been through a particular historical experience”.39 As a concept and an ideol-
ogy, it obtained a remarkable effectiveness uniting white liberals and conservatives in the United 
States;40 cementing a foreign policy consensus in the west, and forging a strong domestic anti-
communist front. 
A very popular “figure of speech” in the west at that time, the polarity between totalitarianism (com-
munism) and antitotalitarianism (anticommunism) involved asymmetrical counter-concepts,41 
“through a binary conceptualization heavily unilateral and derogatory”.42 As a term, antitotalitar-
ian/anticommunist could thus appeal collectively to liberals, conservatives, the noncommunist 
left, ex-communists, and even rightwing extremists, as was the case in Greece. For the radical 
rightwing organisations of the 1950s, however, communism was associated with gangsterism, in 
what was pure demonology. In that respect, these groups were distanced from the antitotalitarian 
discourse, and were rather marginal vis-à-vis the cultural identity of the west. What differentiated 
them still further was their fervent nationalism which ran counter to Atlanticism and loyalty to the 
alliances of the western world.43 In the US, both liberals and conservatives attacked extremist atti-
tudes as hostile to the real spirit of the American political tradition, i.e. the so-called democracy of 
consensus. For Clinton Rossiter (an “American nationalist” of the distinct postwar group called the 
new conservatives who made it clear that he didn’t know “whether he was a liberal conservative or 
a conservative liberal”)44 there was an American right consisting of antiliberal and antiradical reac-
tionaries, authoritarians and “confessed enemies of constitutional democracy”, who “talked like lib-
erals and acted like Fascists”.45 Richard Hofstadter, professor of American history at Columbia Uni-
versity, elaborating on the antitotalitarian political vocabulary and referring to the same rightwing 
tradition a decade later, argued that Goldwater’s nomination as the Republican candidate for the 
presidency (1964), was a “vital blow at the American political order”, because it relied upon “zealotry 
rather than negotiation and accommodation”. In that era, characterised by the ascendance of liberal 
politics and political reform, the basic premises of the consensual ethos of the 1950s were chal-
lenged by a recurrence of extremism; an extremism which initiated ideological politics in the US.46 
Another like-minded scholar, the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, author of Political Man and 
The First New Nation, had on various occasions characterised the Goldwater phenomenon as “ex-
tremist”, “extremist conservatism”, “dogmatic conservatism” and “political reaction”.47 Ιn the same 
vein, the antitotalitarian ethos could not be reduced to extremism for the Austrian Manès Sperber, 
a member of the “brilliant fellowship of exile in postwar Paris”,48 who refused to side with McCarthy 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 03:00:24 |
77
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 14.2 (2014)
and his followers against Stalinism, just as he refused to fight alongside the leftists against McCa-
rthy.49 Similar views were voiced by Albert Camus, who opposed any form of anticommunism that 
could be assimilated by Franco’s regime or neonazis.50 The outspokenly pro-American Raymond 
Aron observed that in politics they are only pragmatists, not zealots or extremists, since they have 
little liking for ideologies.51 Yet in his book Le grand schisme (1948), Aron, referring to the Soviet 
camp, pointed out categorically: “Against a military and religious sect which strictly applies the prin-
ciple whoever is not with me is against me, the only honourable attitude is either total agreement 
or absolute refusal. No half-measure is conceivable.”52 Not to mention that during the inaugural 
session of the CCF in West Berlin in 1950, he criticised harshly all conceptions of European neu-
trality, along with James Burnham, who was hostile to all partisans of peace. 
Though in France the communists were considered a part of the nation, even though there were 
deemed to be opposed to its interests, a similar argument to Aron’s can be found in a Greek right-
wing newspaper two years after the end of the Greek Civil War.53 In 1951, the editor of the daily 
Kathimerini, George Vlachos, one of the prominent rightwing journalists in the 1940s and 50s, as-
serted that for the first time in the history of political struggles in Greece, what was at stake was 
the outcome of the fight between the nation and the antination. At the end of the civil war, the defi-
nition of what constituted the enemy of the nation had become clear and definitive for the anticom-
munists; it was communism or Slavo-communism as a spatial and cultural threat to hellenism 
and the free world in general. Even after the end of that war, which was depicted in Greece and in 
the west as part of the international struggle against Soviet and “Slavic totalitarianism”, the Greek 
state maintained that it was faced and continued to face a serious threat from communism inside 
its borders. The ideology of national-mindedness (the response to the declared “internal enemy” 
threat), which resulted in the exclusion of communists and fellow travellers from the national body 
politic, was certainly nourished by prevalent nationalist and anti-Slav, as well as anticommunist, 
perceptions of the past, but this fact did not make this ideology in any way unsuitable to be consid-
ered as an integral part of Cold War anticommunism; by no means though could Greece be con-
sidered a model liberal democracy.
Nationalism and loyalty to the allies, as the main features of the aforementioned ideology of nation-
al-mindedness, coexisted harmoniously for most, though not all, at the time (the most prominent 
exception being the Cyprus issue in the 1950s). Although the assumption that the Hellenes were 
the real founders of western culture derives from another, much older experience, its articulation 
in the new space of experience opened up by the Cold War was of crucial importance for the con-
struction of the new Greek identity at this particular juncture. The argument, as described by Kon-
stantinos Tsatsos, a conservative scholar and politician, runs as follows: Greece was assigned a 
specific and unique cultural mission: the transmission of the Greek idea of liberty to the rest of the 
world. At the end of the Middle Ages, “when the European soul was exhausted due to the stag-
nation of Christianity and the heroic spirit of chivalry, the Greek logos provided the necessary re-
newal . . . From the depth of the ancient myth, hubris has been synonymous with the violation of 
the unwritten law of respect for measure which puts limits to all human actions.” Indeed, Greek-
ness appeared to be the quintessential expression of western culture, since Greece had given the 
west all the ideals for which it was now fighting. The antithesis that was constructed here between 
measure and extremism, position and denial, logos and pathos, in the middle of a political con-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 03:00:24 |
Establishing the cultural identity of the west in the early Cold War
78
juncture marked by the “battle of Athens” between the communists and the British in December 
1944, introduced, according to Tsatsos, a universal criterion of differentiation between material-
ism/communism and Greekness.54
In the same vein, André Malraux, in the first issue of the conservative periodical Liberté de l’Esprit 
(February 1949), wrote an appeal to the young intellectuals to use the “language of good faith and 
measure”, and dialogue “in the place of a systematic incomprehension and outrage”. He added that 
a historical logic imposed by force was likely to leave every anticommunist open to the accusation 
that he was nothing more than a fascist of the right. The case of the Rassemblement du Peuple 
Français (Rally of the French People), General de Gaulle’s party, was cited by Malraux, a promi-
nent novelist and also prominent Gaullist, as a typical victim of such campaigns.55 The expression 
fascists of the right, however, was also used by the Greek rightwing press in juxtaposition to the 
fascists of the left in order to suggest that Greece in the 1940s was engaged in a two-front war 
against Nazism and Slavism/communism.
The best known case of a problematic relationship between nationalism and loyalty to the alliance 
is France. It was due to the frustrations that this relationship provoked in the context of the decolo-
nisation process, the strong influence of the French Communist Party on political and intellectual 
life, and the Fourth Republic’s inability to choose clearly between national sovereignty and the con-
cessions necessary for European unification; between neutralist tendencies for strategic autonomy 
on the one hand56 and Atlanticism on the other. The difficult relations with the US, which led to se-
rious confrontations on the diplomatic level during the early and mid-1950s,57 as well as France’s 
“structural anti-Americanism”58 and its ambivalent stance, should be understood in this respect. 
In addition to these nationalist European frictions, the west had to cope with the different cultural 
heritage of the new nations in Asia and Africa, at a moment when a “new sensitivity” was forged 
towards a more universalistic perspective. This perspective implied the crucial issue of the eco-
nomic and political relations of the new nations with the US and the European countries of the west. 
Shils chose to distinguish the European/American attitude towards twentieth-century nationalism 
“as a source of great troubles springing from the passions”, from the sense of nationalism of the 
African and Asian states in general, a nationalism which was an integral part of their conception 
of freedom. Shils’ position on this issue was formulated in response to the tension generated by 
the session on nationalism of the CCF’s Milan conference under the heading of “Threats and Ob-
stacles to a Free Society”.59
The French journalist and essayist Thierry Maulnier wrote in Preuves in favour of European uni-
fication and against the “old patriotism of the Communist Party and the nationalists who en-
compassed the idea of national grandeur”.60 Preuves also reproduced an article by the Spanish 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset defending the idea of the construction of a great nation in con-
tinental Europe. The crisis over the European Defence Community in the autumn of 1954 and 
West Germany’s accession to Nato and the Western European Union in 1955, “established the 
‘double containment’ (of the USSR thanks to the Western Alliance and of West Germany within 
that same alliance)”.61
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On a theoretical level, the old idea that freedom was a “fighting faith” which had to be defended on 
a worldwide scale, not only echoed Arthur Schlesinger’s Vital Center (1949), the standard main-
stream liberal reference book, but it was a generally accepted view, as evidenced in an NSC-68, a 
review of foreign policy challenges, requested by Truman in early 1950. The main argument that 
sustained this view was that “the assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and . . . a defeat of 
free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”.62 Within the rhetorical forms used in the con-
text of America’s relationship with the world, the “missionary imperative” is linked to the “concep-
tion of global interdependence”.63 
One can also explore affinities between the ideology of “nationally minded” Greeks and the ideol-
ogy which John Fousek characterised as “American nationalist globalism”, i.e. an ideology deeply 
rooted in the historic notions of chosenness, destiny and mission.64 
The Korean War was viewed as a communist assault either against American or against Greek 
freedom. Both countries, in their official discourse,65 embraced a universal role with strong nation-
alist overtones. According to a Greek rightwing daily, the “spirit of Grammos” (the site of the most 
important victory of the Greek army against the communists in the Civil War) was “reglorified” in 
Korea, where the Greeks had the opportunity to “regenerate their sense of nationality”.66 Accord-
ing to this logic, in the battle against communism, communist aggression in Greece amounted to 
a crime against humanity, since western civilisation had been born there. Panagiotis Kanellopou-
los, a prominent conservative politician who represented Greece at the Berlin conference in 1950, 
said that he felt proud for Greece as “after ten years of hard struggle, it was not simply a democ-
racy; it was a winning democracy”.67
The pairs of concepts 
What is suggested at this point is that the variants of the globalised anticommunist discourse in 
the west comprise several core components which create a semantic field around the concept 
of totalitarianism. Along with it, an iconography was created in the west which enabled people to 
re-evaluate their experiences, and even homogenise a differentiated, multifarious totality, while 
re-reading their expectations. This categorisation presupposes no essential distinction between 
erudite and vulgar explorations of anticommunism. In this type of textual analysis, the author’s in-
tentions matter less than his/her scripta.68 
The core conceptual units and the basic political concepts69 of the antitotalitarian discourse in the 
west provided a self-definition as well as a number of counter-concepts for characterising the oth-
er. These pairs of concepts, which divided the world, were the following: 
• Democracy versus totalitarianism or Soviet imperialism/tyranny/slavery/despotism/dic-
tatorship, and oligarchy70 versus pluralism, moderation, compromise and respect of the 
interests and the opinions of the people.
• The defence of the values of universal freedom, freedom of the spirit and critical reflection 
as opposed to totalitarian oppression and the destruction of individuality. To illustrate this 
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last notion (destruction de la personne) cited by Melvyn Lasky,71 we can refer to Gabriel 
Marcel, the French “philosopher of existence”, who asserted that in a totalitarian country 
individual freedom is absent, while the individual loses contact with herself/himself to an 
extent that s/he denies the acts that s/he has committed and/or accuses herself/himself 
for things s/he has never done. Stoicism, as a mental attitude, which was based on the 
belief that the individual had an “inviolable and inviolate refuge against the intrusions of 
power”, is completely eradicated under oppressive regimes.72 Freedom of thought under 
such regimes is abolished and a total ideology is created and imposed forcibly on the indi-
vidual, controlling all actions, outer expressions, as well as inner emotional life. 
• Open society versus fanaticism, dogmatism and evil. It is worth noting in this respect that 
even Arthur Schlesinger Jr, the liberal Harvard historian who usually adopted a more nu-
anced approach in his writings, insisted in Encounter in January 1960 that, despite the 
changes which had taken place since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union remained a 
“theological society run by a collection of true believers”. The heart of Soviet dogmatism 
was the principle of infallibility, applied to the leader, the party and to a particular theory 
of history.73 The gist of his argument was that in a totalitarian society, children were sub-
jected to systematic indoctrination that turned them into “the most orthodox, rigid, and 
hopeless group in that society”.74 Students of antitotalitarianism can find this assertion not 
only in Schlesinger but also in an April 1950 article in Foreign Affairs by the German an-
ti-Nazi journalist Marion Dönhoff entitled “Germany puts freedom before unity”. Dönhoff, 
later on an outspoken advocate of German reunification, sought in that article to highlight 
the similarities between the youth organisation under Nazism and the communist youth 
organisation in East Germany. 
Reference to the theme of the indoctrination of children can also be found in Greek anticommunist 
discourse, on the occasion of the forcible “gathering of village children” in territories controlled by 
the communist Democratic Army during the civil war, and their removal northwards to Eastern 
bloc countries. The nationally minded characterised the “abduction” of Greek children as a great 
crime against the Greek race, and Stratis Myrivilis, a well-known Greek novelist, drew a parallel 
with the abduction of Greek children by the Ottomans to serve in the Janissary corps; in both cases, 
the alleged aim was for Greek children to lose their Christian and “national conscience”. 
The corollary to this was that the Greek children would be turned into monolithic communists who, 
according to the same Greek author, were members of another “inferior race” whose strength was 
“hatred and mercilessness”, “persons who cheat, lie, rape and violate”.75 This notion of the “new 
type of man” is linked to patterns of racial prejudice, clothed in anthropological terms. In his influ-
ential Sociologie du communisme, the French sociologist Jules Monnerot also sees parallels, this 
time, between communism and Islam. In his opinion, the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt and the Safavid 
in Persia, both Shiite, forged a historical myth intended to fanaticise the people and make them 
hostile towards their own society. In a similar fashion, Soviet Russia and Islam share one com-
mon characteristic: the confusion of politics with religion.76 Monnerot, the German-born American 
philosopher Eric Voegelin and Aron, employed – among others – the concept of secular religion in 
analysing communism.77
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Thus, communism is antithetical to Christianity, family and traditions.78 Homo sovieticus has no 
pity for either his parents or his brothers and sisters and was turned into a robot.79 The new re-
ligion created by totalitarian regimes purports to serve the race or the history and the class. The 
bottom line was that totalitarianism destroys all community, all shared experience, the elites80 and 
all shared understanding. 
One further theme juxtaposed the welfare democracies of the west with the poverty and exploita-
tion which reigned in the “totalitarian empire”. Edward Stettinius, in the State Department Bulletin 
(22 April 1945), and President Truman in his speech before Congress, known as the Truman doc-
trine (12 March 1947), associated economic misery and distress, on the one hand, with the repres-
sive political regimes of the Soviet empire and the emergence of totalitarianism, on the other, in a 
clearly causal relation. This line of argument, taken up by US public officials for obvious reasons, 
could be linked to the old argument that fascism and Nazism were – a contrario – political authori-
tarianisms created in response to economic crisis. The aforementioned themes can be gleaned 
from several anticommunist periodicals of that time, which presumably played a rather significant 
role in the formation of mass culture. Purporting to engage in investigative journalism, these pe-
riodicals sought to publicise widely the eastern experience to the west, through an intensive treat-
ment of “way of living” issues in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.81 
Conclusion
To sum up, the proposed semasiological analysis is just one way of bringing into focus the patterns 
of thought, the values and the mentalities that ascribed meaning to a divided world. The aforemen-
tioned discourse, which expresses the uniformity of the global against the plurality of the particular, 
is intercultural both in the sense that various political traditions (liberal and conservative) cooper-
ated in its formulation and in that various anticommunist political cultures were represented in it. 
It is also intertextual – to use a term associated with structuralism and poststructuralism – in the 
sense that it puts the writer in the position of a participant in a “community of discourse” that cre-
ates its own collective meaning.82
Finally, this new discourse – which created a global community of readers since theorists and lay-
men alike had (partly) common references drawn from their readings – represented a major in-
stance of the “great certainties” in western political thought. It could also draw further strength from 
the universalistic character that the west attributed to their ideology,83 an ideology which reduced 
communist experience to a fundamental property.84 For intellectuals such as Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, however, the recognition of the fact that there was oppression in the 
USSR did not mean that it should be targeted as the enemy number one (and sometimes as the 
only enemy), because to adopt such a stance, oppression in the non-Soviet world (colonialism, un-
employment, Spanish prisoners and deportees in Greece) was left undiscussed.85
Communism was reduced to an idea, a utopia based on a totalising ideological system. Its only 
aspect as a lived experience86 – in the pages of the CCF periodicals – was the defection from it,87 
and this defection was generously illustrated by the testimonies of ex-communists, intellectual 
exiles and émigré writers, such as David Rousset, Michel Koriakoff, Victor Kravchenko, Czesław 
Miłosz,88 Ignazio Silone, Kot Jeleński and Arthur Koestler.89 These testimonies had, no doubt, in-
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tellectual and moral significance for the antitotalitarian movement, especially in countries that had 
developed a civic culture. Karl Jaspers and Ignazio Silone, presenting the work of Rousset and 
Miłosz, congratulated them for making public their mature experience concerning the complexity 
of human life and for their courage to speak the truth.90 At a time when more and more evidence 
for the Holocaust was forthcoming and widely publicised,91 the testimony of émigrés regarding 
their predicament in the “Soviet camp” grew on an already cultivated ground, formed by audiences 
who were prepared to listen, and were highly valued. The world fame which they achieved, due 
not only to the support of CCF periodicals but also to the literary merits in presenting their “expe-
rience of totalitarianism”, ensured their books circulated well. Rousset’s L’Univers concentration-
naire served, according to Preuves, as a key concept of the consciousness of the free world, while 
the works of Aron, Rousset, Monnerot, Camus, and others, and the concepts that they employed, 
created “a common fund of knowledge and provided a working basis which would be retained”.92
These concepts of antitotalitarianism – characterised by their claim to universality – embodied in 
the work of those who perceived themselves as members of an intellectual partnership, produced 
patterns of thought, and also an image of the otherness, which went beyond different national ex-
periences and particularities. The emergence of the “cultural other” had been made possible by this 
conceptualisation of the enemy. The impact of antitotalitarian ideology on national imaginaries and 
political cultures was worldwide, especially in the core countries of the west. It was however het-
erogeneous: different nations and peoples continued to experience historical events, such as for 
example the Hungarian insurrection or the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia later on, in a similar-
yet-particular manner. In other words, it was an experience based on the aforementioned com-
mon fund, the common working basis, tempered or enforced by the particularities of each country, 
arising from its past historical experience in all its variants.
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antistalinien à Paris (Paris: Edition Ramsay, 1990).
89   Koestler and others devoted much of their energy to the Fund for Intellectual Freedom (Fonds de Soli-
darité des Intellectuels), donating a percentage of their royalties to émigré writers. See Wilford, The CIA, 
118, n. 103 and Les Amis de la Liberté (Dec 1950–Jan 1951): 13.
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90   On this see Preuves (Apr 1953) and Czesław Miłosz, La pensée captive. Essai sur les logocraties popu-
laires, trans. André Prudhommeaux, foreword Karl Jaspers (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), 11.
91   Founded in 1951 by Rousset, the International Commission against the Concentration Camp Prac tices 
(Commission Internationale contre le Régime Concentrationnaire) was an organisation which tried to 
provide information about concentration and detention camps in Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia and the 
USSR. The CICRC published also a report on the Algerian camps (Le Monde, 15 May 1957). On its goals, 
see “La résistance européenne contre le régime concentrationnaire,” Preuves (Apr 1951): 24–25.
92   Preuves (Mar 1952): 45–47.
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